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Efficient risk transfer in PPP wastewater treatment projects

Asheem Shrestha, Toong-Khuan Chan, Ajibade A. Aibinu and Chuan Chen

Utilities Policy, 2017, vol. 48, issue C, 132-140

Abstract: Risk transfer in public private partnerships (PPPs) may not always be conducive to efficient management due to principal agent problems. This paper identifies three parameters: (i) competition, (ii) monitoring and (iii) incentives, for transferring risks in a principal agent relationship. These parameters are applied to three PPP wastewater projects. The findings illustrate that competition determines the private sectors’ ability to bear risks, monitoring reduces ex-post information asymmetry and incentive ensures that risks are efficiently managed. The lessons learnt from the case studies can provide guidance for governments in transferring risks efficiently in PPP wastewater treatment projects.

Keywords: Public private partnerships (PPPs); Risk transfer; Wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:48:y:2017:i:c:p:132-140