Competition, regulation and price controls in the GB retail energy market

Stephen Littlechild

Utilities Policy, 2018, vol. 52, issue C, 59-69

Abstract: After 2008 Ofgem increasingly intervened in the GB domestic (residential) retail energy market. The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found that ‘weak customer response’ gave the major suppliers market power, which they used to set excessive prices and to discriminate against less engaged customers. The CMA quantified the customer detriment at an average of £1.4bn per year. In 2018 the Government proposed that Ofgem impose a widespread price cap. This paper explains the evolution of this policy then challenges the Ofgem and CMA analyses. Despite a concern about price differentials, especially involving vulnerable customers, there is not a competition problem.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:59-69

DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2018.04.007

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