A cooperative game-based mechanism for allocating ancillary service costs associated with wind power integration in China

Junfeng Hu, Qingyou Yan, Xingmei Li, Zhong-Zhong Jiang, Fredrich Kahrl, Jiang Lin and Peng Wang

Utilities Policy, 2019, vol. 58, issue C, 120-127

Abstract: Wind power in China is developing rapidly. However, wind power curtailment has become increasingly severe, reaching 15% in 2015. The root cause of wind power curtailment in China is that its power system has insufficient flexibility. We analyze how to achieve a reasonable allocation of ancillary service costs for wind power plants, using a cooperative game approach. The analysis shows that, while the current allocation approach in the Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan power grid is based only on wind feed-in tariffs, an allocation method based on both the feed-in tariff and the capacity credit of wind would be more reasonable.

Keywords: Wind power; Ancillary service; Cost allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:58:y:2019:i:c:p:120-127

DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.008

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