Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model
Domenico Buccella () and
Utilities Policy, 2020, vol. 64, issue C
This study considers whether an incumbent firm can find it profitable to recognise a union and bargain over wages and employment, rather than to face a competitive labour market without unions. Using a sequential game model, this analysis shows that an incumbent firm may recognise a union to deter entry when network effects are sufficiently low.
Keywords: Unionised oligopoly; Competitive labour market; Efficient bargaining; Market entry and entry deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:64:y:2020:i:c:s0957178720300205
Access Statistics for this article
Utilities Policy is currently edited by D. Smith
More articles in Utilities Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().