Out by the door, in through the window: Politics and natural gas regulation in Russia
Claude Menard (),
Alexander Kurdin () and
Utilities Policy, 2020, vol. 64, issue C
This article deals with the regulation of the natural gas sector in Russia through the lens of institutional economics. It proposes a framework in which ‘meso-institutions’ bridge the gap between the macro-institutions shaping the ‘rules of the game,’ with the Kremlin at the core, and the micro-layer within which firms operate. We argue that the slow reform process comes from conflicts of interest embedded in these meso-institutions, specifically: the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Economic Development. Based on official documents, data from various public sources, and semi-directive interviews and discussions, our analysis shows that parties are locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium.
Keywords: Natural gas; Institutions; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:64:y:2020:i:c:s0957178720300461
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