Screening for collusion in wholesale electricity markets: A literature review
David Brown,
Andrew Eckert and
Douglas Silveira
Utilities Policy, 2023, vol. 85, issue C
Abstract:
Wholesale electricity markets have several features that increase the likelihood of collusion, including frequent interaction, multimarket contact, and a high degree of information transparency. As a result, screening techniques for detecting collusive agreements are desired. This study surveys the literature on screens for collusion and collusion in electricity markets. We discuss key features of non-competitive behaviour to be reflected in screens and suggest directions for improved screening in this industry. In particular, due to recent improvements in these methods, there is considerable potential to include machine learning and data mining techniques in screens in the electricity sector.
Keywords: Screening methods; Collusion; Electricity markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L94 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:85:y:2023:i:c:s0957178723001832
DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2023.101671
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