Rent-seeking in megaprojects: The case of Turkey's public-private partnerships for roads

Ali Osman Solak

Utilities Policy, 2025, vol. 96, issue C

Abstract: This study investigates how Turkey's public-private partnership (PPP) road projects under the AKP administration transformed into an institutionalized rent-extraction mechanism and a tool for political consolidation. Drawing on an in-depth case study and diverse sources, this analysis argues that these projects were systematically structured through manipulated feasibility and traffic forecasts, contractual opacity, and asymmetric risk allocation that favoured private partners with excessive state guarantees. All of these factors were exacerbated by declining governance quality. This systemic subversion led to infrastructure underutilization, significant fiscal burdens, and social inequity, providing a critical perspective on the risks associated with PPPs in weak institutional contexts.

Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships; Rent-Seeking; Cronyism; Deception; Transparency; Revenue Guarantees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:96:y:2025:i:c:s0957178725000992

DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2025.101984

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