EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Ambiguity in state-owned land property rights increases transaction costs in China’s transit-oriented development projects

Dongsheng He, Jinshuo Wang and Guibo Sun

Land Use Policy, 2025, vol. 152, issue C

Abstract: This paper provides compelling evidence that the ambiguity in state-owned land property rights increases transaction costs in China’s transit-oriented development (TOD) projects. The constitution defines the state as the de jure (legally defined) owner of urban land, but tiers of local government share the de facto (practically controlled) land property rights; this ambiguity complicates land use right transfer for TOD. Through expert interviews, document analysis, and case studies in Guangzhou, we identified three critical issues. First, ambiguity in de facto land property rights has led district governments to relocate the metro depot site from a profitable plot suitable for metro scheduling and property development to land plots that are less advantageous and far away from the station. Second, the coexistence of land allocation and leasing approaches under state ownership discouraged an optimised land assembly for the TOD project. Rigid acquisition sizes designated in land allocation for infrastructure discouraged coordination and prolonged negotiations between the district government and the metro company. Finally, the district government faced a disproportionate fiscal responsibility compared to their land leasing share from the municipal government. They are thus passively against the TOD project using their land use planning power. These transaction costs delay the TOD project and jeopardise the outcomes, resulting in depots far from metro stations, housing adjacent to industrial areas, and oversized commercial spaces on urban fringes. We argue that the ambiguity in state-owned land property rights is rooted in China’s historical, cultural, and institutional contexts, driving high transaction costs for urban infrastructure development.

Keywords: Institutional arrangement; Transaction cost; Property rights; Transit-oriented development; Rail plus Property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264837725000341
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:152:y:2025:i:c:s0264837725000341

DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2025.107501

Access Statistics for this article

Land Use Policy is currently edited by Jaap Zevenbergen

More articles in Land Use Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joice Jiang ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-24
Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:152:y:2025:i:c:s0264837725000341