Land use and decentralized government: A strategic approach for playing a short-sighted equilibrium

Maria Carmela Aprile, Bruno Chiarini and Elisabetta Marzano

Land Use Policy, 2019, vol. 89, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents a simple strategic model (defined as a shortsighted game) to highlight the incentives for local governments to allow the exploitation of land in areas not suitable for such exploitation due to environmental or other risks. Municipal discretionary policy inevitably produces strategic complementarities and guides individuals to use the land (to choose the most beneficial “shortsighted” Nash equilibrium). In light of these results, it seems possible to state that the definition of non-exploitable territory and the decisions concerning it should not be left to local governments.

Keywords: Land exploitation; Municipal policy; Strategic complementarities; Myopic equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H31 H77 Q24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Land Use and Decentralized Government: A Strategic Approach for Playing a Short-Sighted Equilibrium (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:89:y:2019:i:c:s0264837718314066

DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104220

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