Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'

Þórólfur Matthíasson ()

Marine Policy, 1992, vol. 16, issue 3, 210-231

Abstract: The efficiency and equity consequences of different rules for the allocation of rights to utilize a common renewable resource such as the demersal fish stocks in the waters around Iceland is discussed. It is asked whether regulatory processes under consideration in Iceland can be reversed and at what cost. It is also asked which distributional mechanisms are generated when interest groups have managed to acquire or are bestowed with the authority to distribute rights to utilize a former common resource. An attempt is made to find out what characterizes a 'good' contract in terms of efficiency and equity. It is also asked what rules different interest groups have supported in the debate about just distribution of the rent from the fishing grounds around Iceland.

Date: 1992
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