Theory and practice of ITQs in Iceland. Privatization of common fishing rights

Einar Eythórsson

Marine Policy, 1996, vol. 20, issue 3, 269-281

Abstract: In Iceland, fish quotas have been partly transferable since 1984 and freely transferable since 1991. Here, the assumption that an ITQ-regime will lead to an immediate reduction of catch capacity and discourage investment in the fisheries seems questionable, as the ITQ-regime seems to represent an input of "new" capital into the fisheries. As a result of quota leasing arrangements, tenancy relations have developed between parts of the coastal fleet and companies with large quota holdings. Crew wages have in these cases dropped, a situation that has provoked two strikes among fishermen. The demand for quotas is influenced by unemployment and lack of alternative sources of income for fishermen. Municipalities are in a number of cases significant participants in the quota market, as there are strong ties between companies and municipalities. A redistribution of wealth and income is taking place as a result of the system.

Date: 1996
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