Neo-classical economics, institutional economics and improved fisheries management

Tsjalle van der Burg

Marine Policy, 2000, vol. 24, issue 1, 45-51

Abstract: According to neo-classical economists, taxes and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are the most efficient measures for dealing with the problem of overfishing. Institutional economists, however, criticise neo-classical economists for neglecting political problems, enforcement problems and transaction costs. In relation to this, they argue that taxes and ITQs have serious weaknesses as well. Taking account of both neo-classical and institutional arguments, a new management system is proposed. The system is as efficient in the neo-classical sense as taxes and ITQs, but it also has certain advantages in view of institutional aspects.

Keywords: Fishery; management; Institutional; economics; Enforcement; Political; problems; Transaction; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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