Theory and practice of why auctions differ--a study of two fish auctions in Norway

Claire W. Armstrong

Marine Policy, 2001, vol. 25, issue 3, 209-214

Abstract: In this paper we will study two auctions for fish found in Norway, and compare them applying auction theoretical assumptions. We will use the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) as a basis to explain why these two different auction mechanisms are chosen for the sale of fish. It is shown that the issues of risk aversion, common values and inclusion of travel costs may explain the choice of auction institution.

Keywords: Fish; auctions; Norway; Revenue; equivalence; theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:25:y:2001:i:3:p:209-214

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