Precaution, ICES and the common fisheries policy: a study of regime interplay

Olav Schram Stokke and Clare Coffey

Marine Policy, 2004, vol. 28, issue 2, 117-126

Abstract: This article examines the interplay between the precautionary provisions in the global fisheries regime and problem-solving under (1) the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and (2) the EU Common Fisheries Policy. The causal processes are partly ideational (learning-driven) and partly normative (commitments-driven). The effect is synergistic: the UN Fish Stocks Agreement strengthened the hand of those within ICES and EU fisheries bodies who favoured greater safety margins, long-term planning and pre-agreement on recovery plans for endangered stocks--without disrupting cooperative relations. There is some awareness among participants in source and target regimes of the fact of interaction and also preparedness to respond to it.

Keywords: EU; common; fisheries; policy; Fisheries; management; Fisheries; research; International; council; for; the; exploration; of; the; sea; Institutional; interplay; International; regimes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:28:y:2004:i:2:p:117-126

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