Management responses to the problem of incidental catch in fishing: A comparative analysis of the EU, Norway, and the Faeroe Islands

Stig S. Gezelius

Marine Policy, 2008, vol. 32, issue 3, 360-368

Abstract: The article addresses incidental catch as a two-level management problem for systems that regulate fish catches. The first level is legal and concerns the problem of establishing clear and legitimate criteria for criminal liability. The second level is environmental and concerns the efficacy of chosen liability criteria in resource conservation. The article compares and explains the solutions chosen by Norway, the Faeroe Islands, and the EU. Each solution constitutes a distinct form of fisheries management. It is argued that national choices are determined by administrative capacity for implementation and political autonomy in the distribution of fishing rights.

Keywords: Incidental; catch; Fisheries; management; Implementation; Discards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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