 Individual transferable quotas versus auctioned seasonal quotas: An experimental investigationErling Moxnes Marine Policy, 2012, vol. 36, issue 2, 339-349 Abstract: Fishery policies have largely developed in response to revealed problems with existing policy instruments. The last major innovation is the introduction of individual transferable quotas, ITQs. Experience thus far is promising. However, if history repeats itself, it is pertinent to start exploring further improvements. Among other things, concerns may be raised about the efficiency of ITQs, financial risks to owners of quotas and fishing vessels, and problems with fairness and collection of resource rent. These issues are studied with a laboratory experiment. Different from previous experiments it allows for trade of both quotas and vessels. In addition, the experiment tests an alternative institutional arrangement, namely auctioned seasonal quotas, ASQs. Neither of the two systems turns out to be as perfect as economic theory predicts. While the two systems are similar in some respects, the ASQ system allows for taxation of resource rent, and surprisingly, it may be the system with the lowest financial risk for fishing firms. Keywords: Transferable quotas; Auctions; Fishery management; Dynamics; Uncertainty; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:36:y:2012:i:2:p:339-349 DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2011.07.003 Access Statistics for this article Marine Policy is currently edited by Eddie Brown More articles in Marine Policy from Elsevier |
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