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Corruption and regulatory compliance: Experimental findings from South African small-scale fisheries

Aksel Sundström

Marine Policy, 2012, vol. 36, issue 6, 1255-1264

Abstract: Although corruption is often mentioned as an obstacle to fisheries management, its negative effects have seldom been investigated empirically in a systematic manner. This article examines the impact of corruption on regulatory compliance among South African small-scale fishermen. Results from scenario experiments with 181 participants confirm that perceived corruptibility of the enforcing authority corrodes the willingness to comply with regulations. Both grand and petty types of corruption have significant effects. Attitudes related to moral support of the regulations, perceived inclusion in the decision making leading to regulations and an individual record of law breaking all affect the willingness to comply. However, these effects are trumped by the relative size of the negative impact of corruption. These findings underline the importance of curbing corruption involving public officials in the small-scale fisheries sector.

Keywords: Corruption; Regulatory compliance; Small-scale fisheries; South Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:36:y:2012:i:6:p:1255-1264

DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2012.03.013

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