Efficiency of the New Zealand annual catch entitlement market

James Stewart and Jonathan Leaver

Marine Policy, 2015, vol. 55, issue C, 11-22

Abstract: Balancing catch with annual catch entitlement (ACE) is crucial both for the financial viability of fishers and for the efficient operation of the New Zealand quota management system (QMS). This study examines the information channels that are used by fishers to search for ACE availability, and notes how these channels differ between large and small fishers. Special attention is given to the viability of small independent fishers whose participation in the fishery is dependent on their acquiring ACE in the open ACE market. An ACE market survey along with extensive consultation captured the views of fishers, fish processors, and quota brokers. These sources provide valuable insights into the day-to-day operation of the ACE market. They suggest that while elements of market power are evident in the ACE market there are also characteristics of an efficient market.

Keywords: Annual catch entitlement (ACE); Efficient markets; Information channels; Transaction cost; Deemed value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:55:y:2015:i:c:p:11-22

DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2015.01.005

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