 Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic playersMathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 100, issue C, 1-12 Abstract: Path-dependence in coordination games may cause lock-in on inefficient outcomes, such as inferior technologies (Arthur, 1989) or inefficient economic institutions (North, 1990). To calculate the conditions under which lock-in can be overcome, we develop a solution concept that makes ex-ante predictions about the adaptation process following lock-in in a critical mass game. We assume that some players are myopic, forming beliefs according to weighted fictitious play, while others are sophisticated, anticipating the learning process of the myopic players. We propose a solution concept based on a Nash equilibrium of the strategies chosen by sophisticated players. Our model predicts that no players would switch from the efficient to the inefficient action, but deviations in the other direction are possible. Three types of equilibria may exist: in the first type lock-in is sustained, while in the other two types lock-in is overcome. We determine the existence conditions for each of these equilibria and show that the equilibria in which lock-in is overcome are more likely and the transition is faster when sophisticated players have a longer planning horizon, or when the history of inefficient coordination is shorter. Date: 2019 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:100:y:2019:i:c:p:1-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.005 Access Statistics for this article Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier |
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