On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
Geoffrey R. Grimmett
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 100, issue C, 35-45
We examine two aspects of the mathematical basis for two-tier voting systems, such as that of the Council of the European Union. These aspects concern the use of square-root weights and the choice of quota.
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