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On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems

Geoffrey R. Grimmett

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 100, issue C, 35-45

Abstract: We examine two aspects of the mathematical basis for two-tier voting systems, such as that of the Council of the European Union. These aspects concern the use of square-root weights and the choice of quota.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.05.003

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