Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions

Takaaki Abe

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 103, issue C, 69-75

Abstract: We axiomatize Hart and Kurz’s (1983) two coalition aggregation functions known as the γ-function and the δ-function. A coalition aggregation function is a mapping that assigns a partition to each profile of coalitions selected by players. Through our axiomatization results, we observe that neither the γ-function nor the δ-function satisfies monotonicity. We propose a monotonic function and axiomatically characterize it.

Keywords: Axiomatization; Coalition formation; Coalition structure; Monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:103:y:2020:i:c:p:69-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.12.001

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