Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

Christian Trudeau and Juan Vidal-Puga

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 103, issue C, 8-14

Abstract: We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These so-called clique games are such that agents are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multiple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belongs to their intersection. Finally, if two agents do not belong to the same clique, there is at most one way to link the two agents through a chain of agents, with any two non-adjacent agents in the chain belonging to disjoint sets of cliques. We examine multiple games defined on graphs that provide a fertile ground for applications of our results.

Keywords: Nucleolus; Shapley value; Clique; Graphs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (2018)
Working Paper: Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (2018)
Working Paper: Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:103:y:2020:i:c:p:8-14

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.002

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