Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions

Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 104, issue C, 60-67

Abstract: We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy implementable allocation rules and impose the property of welfarism, which makes it possible for any allocation rule to induce a bargaining solution. Our main result is that an allocation rule is dominant strategy implementable and satisfies welfarism and some mild requirements if and only if it induces a dictatorial solution.

Keywords: Bargaining problem; Bargaining solution; Dominant strategy implementation; Welfarism; Dictatorial solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:104:y:2020:i:c:p:60-67

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.01.008

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