On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium

Bertrand Crettez and Rabia Nessah

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 105, issue C, 41-47

Abstract: We provide existence and characterization results for unilateral support equilibrium in n-player games. A unilateral support equilibrium is a strategy profile such that the teammates of each agent unilaterally choose their strategies to maximize his payoff. We also consider the case of unilateral support equilibrium relative to a coalition structure, wherein mutual (but still unilateral) support is coalitionaly dependent, and agents who do not belong to a coalition follow a Nash behavior. Further, we compare unilateral support equilibrium with Berge equilibrium, strong Berge equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium and the α-core. We also compare unilateral support equilibrium relative to a coalition structure with the ℭ-absolute optimal solution.

Keywords: Game Theory; Berge equilibrium; Strong Berge equilibrium; Unilateral support equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:105:y:2020:i:c:p:41-47

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.04.004

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