Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination
Camille Cornand and
Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 106, issue C, 101-111
Abstract:
The paper contribution is twofold. It introduces heterogeneous information in a strategic delegation game of a differentiated oligopoly with price competition and it thus provides a micro-founded illustration of a beauty contest, in which the relative weight put on the competition motive of the payoffs is not exogenous but may be manipulated by the players. The conflict between the competition and the fundamental motives, already present in an oligopolistic setting under perfect information, is exacerbated when information is dispersed. A conflict arises also in this case between the competition and the coordination motives, ending up in the undervalueing of public information. We show how firm owners ease these conflicts by opting for some cooperation, thus moderating the competitive toughness displayed by their managers. By doing so, they also enhance the managers’ concern for coordination and consequently heighten the weight put on public relative to private information.
Keywords: Beauty contest; Competition; Cooperation; Coordination; Delegation game; Duopoly with heterogeneous information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination (2020)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination (2017) 
Working Paper: Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination (2015) 
Working Paper: Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:106:y:2020:i:c:p:101-111
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.02.003
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