 Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiomF.R. McMorris, Henry Martyn Mulder, Beth Novick and Robert C. Powers Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 109, issue C, 164-174 Abstract: This paper considers voting rules for two alternatives, viz. the simple majority rule of K.O. May, the majority rule with bias of Fishburn and others, and the majority rule by difference of votes of Goodin and List, and of Llamazares. These all have been characterized axiomatically for profiles of fixed length, that is, for a fixed population. The aim of this paper is to study analogs of these results in the situation where various populations are considered and disjoint populations can be combined into one population. The effect of this shift of focus is that now the domain of the rule consists of all finite nonempty sequences of votes. Young (1974) introduced the axiom of consistency, by which two populations can be combined into one as long as they agree on the output of the voting rule. We use a version of this axiom as given by Roberts (1991). Our paper can be seen as making a strong case for this simple, and natural axiom. Keywords: Majority rule; Majority with bias; Consistency; Partial anonymity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:109:y:2021:i:c:p:164-174 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.001 Access Statistics for this article Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier |
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