Stable agreements through liability rules: A multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem

Kevin Techer

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 111, issue C, 77-88

Abstract: We consider a class of social cost problems in which one polluter interacts with an arbitrary number of potential victims. Agents are supposed to cooperate and negotiate an optimal pollution level together with monetary transfers. We examine multi-choice cooperative games associated with a social cost problem and an assignment (or mapping) of rights. We introduce a class of mappings of rights that takes into account the pollution intensity and we consider three properties on mappings of rights: core compatibility, Kaldor–Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim. We show that there exist only two families of mappings of rights that satisfy core compatibility, while no mapping of rights satisfies Kaldor–Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim.

Keywords: Externality; Liability rules; Multi-choice cooperative game; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016548962100041X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:111:y:2021:i:c:p:77-88

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().