Simple majority rule and integer programming

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Simone Tonin

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 113, issue C, 160-163

Abstract: In this paper, we use the integer programming approach to mechanism design, first introduced by Sethuraman et al. (2003), and then systematized by Vohra (2011), to reformulate issues concerning the simple majority rule. Our main result consists in showing that, when the number of agents is even, a necessary and sufficient condition for the simple majority rule to be an Arrovian social welfare function is that it is defined on a domain which is echoic with antagonistic preferences. This result is an integer programming simplified version of Theorems 2, 3, and 4 in Inada (1969).

Keywords: Social welfare function; Simple majority rule; Integer programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:113:y:2021:i:c:p:160-163

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.001

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