The unbinding core for coalitional form games

Takaaki Abe and Yukihiko Funaki

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 113, issue C, 39-42

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties of the unbinding core. A sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is also provided.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Core; Deviation; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:113:y:2021:i:c:p:39-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007

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