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Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form

Stéphane Gonzalez () and Aymeric Lardon

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 114, issue C, 28-38

Abstract: We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out that the core, whenever it applies to appropriate classes of these games, coincides with a wide variety of prominent stability concepts in social choice and game theory, such as the Condorcet winner, the Nash equilibrium, pairwise stability, and stable matchings, among others. Our characterization of the core invokes the axioms of weak nonemptiness, coalitional unanimity, and Maskin monotonicity together with a principle of independence of irrelevant states, and uses in its proof a holdover property echoing the conventional ancestor property. Taking special cases of this general characterization of the core, we derive new characterizations of the previously mentioned stability concepts.

Keywords: Effectiveness function; Core; Axiomatization; Holdover property; Consistency principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:114:y:2021:i:c:p:28-38

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.09.001

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