On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations

Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 117, issue C, 101-108

Abstract: We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing the weighted product of the agents’ utilities. We show that when agents have binary valuations, a specific version of MWNW is resource- and population-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time.

Keywords: Fair division; Unequal entitlements; Nash welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:117:y:2022:i:c:p:101-108

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.03.004

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