 Organizational form and excess burden of taxation in a multiproduct mixed oligopolyKangsik Choi Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 117, issue C, 47-60 Abstract: We incorporate the excess burden of taxation into a multiproduct mixed oligopoly to analyze the endogenous choice of organizational forms between the multidivisional form (M-form) for divisional incentives and the unitary form (U-form) for corporate incentives. The M-form (U-form) in the managerial delegation for public and private firms is a dominant strategy if the degree of the excess burden of taxation is low (high). Furthermore, asymmetric organizational forms exist in the intermediate range. In a symmetric equilibrium under a mixed duopoly with the M-form, consumer surplus is always greater than that with the U-form, while social welfare crucially depends on whether the excess burden of taxation is higher than a certain threshold. Ultimately, social welfare and consumer surplus are always greater in a mixed duopoly than in privatization. Moreover, extending the analysis of two private firms and one public firm yields (a)symmetric equilibrium in which private firms do not choose the M-form regardless of the degree of the excess burden of taxation. Keywords: M-form; U-form; Delegation; Mixed oligopoly; Excess burden of taxation; Privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:117:y:2022:i:c:p:47-60 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.10.009 Access Statistics for this article Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.