Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit

Werner Kirsch and Gabor Toth

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 119, issue C, 118-137

Abstract: We analyse optimal voting weights in two-tier voting systems. In our model, the overall population (or union) is split in groups (or member states) of different sizes. The individuals comprising the overall population constitute the first tier, and the council is the second tier. Each group has a representative in the council that casts votes on their behalf. By ‘optimal weights’, we mean voting weights in the council which minimise the democracy deficit, i.e. the expected deviation of the council vote from a (hypothetical) popular vote.

Keywords: Two-tier voting systems; Probabilistic voting; Collective bias models; Democracy deficit; Optimal weights; Limit theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:119:y:2022:i:c:p:118-137

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.001

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