Unawareness of decision criteria in multicriteria games

Yasuo Sasaki

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 119, issue C, 31-40

Abstract: The present paper incorporates unawareness into multicriteria games, where agents can have multiple decision criteria and their preferences are represented by vector-valued utility functions. Focusing only on unawareness of decision criteria, we define (weak and strong) Pareto rationalizability as a solution concept for multicriteria games with unawareness, which involves iterated eliminations of never-Pareto optimal actions, and examine its properties. We show that any form of unawareness can decrease the set of weakly Pareto rationalizable actions but will never increase it, while this property does not hold for strong Pareto rationalizability. We also extend the property on the rationalizability concept for weighted games in the standard case to our setting. We apply our framework to a bicriteria Cournot game.

Keywords: Multicriteria games; Unawareness; Rationalizability; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:119:y:2022:i:c:p:31-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.06.004

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