Economics at your fingertips  

Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

Denis Sokolov

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 119, issue C, 76-90

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a new form, the clique function form (CQFF), of TU-games that allows for multiple memberships and explicit externalities. The new notion is based on a graphical representation of the connections between agents in a game. We treat as coalitions only fully connected sub-graphs (i.e., maximal cliques). Following Myerson (1977a) we adapt the well-known efficiency, symmetry, and linearity axioms to the new setting and obtain a unique value for superadditive CQFF games.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Shapley value; Externalities; Multiple memberships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.06.005

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2022-11-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:119:y:2022:i:c:p:76-90