Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies

X. Wang () and Jingang Zhao

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 120, issue C, 37-49

Abstract: This paper advances Motta’s (2004) study of two-firm Bertrand mergers with arbitrary synergies in symmetric linear models to m-firm mergers with cost-savings in asymmetric linear models. It identifies a set of Bertrand mergers that reduce not only consumer surplus but also rival firms’ profits. Such severely anti-competitive mergers are intriguing because they can never happen in both Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Nocke and Schutz (2018).

Keywords: Bertrand competition; Consumer surplus; Horizontal merger; Welfare reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:120:y:2022:i:c:p:37-49

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.002

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