Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade

Akihiko Matsui and Megumi Murakami

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 120, issue C, 50-65

Abstract: We study deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrade by formulating a two-stage model where DA is played in the first stage, and a decentralized market opens in the second. Both non-monetary and monetary retrades are considered. Perfect market equilibrium (PME) is defined: market equilibrium prevails in the second stage both on and off the path, and Nash equilibrium is played in the first stage game induced by the second-stage markets.

Keywords: Deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrade; Perfect market equilibrium (PME); Cyclical priority; Reversed priority; Minimum demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:120:y:2022:i:c:p:50-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.004

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