Essential stationary equilibria of mean field games with finite state and action space

Berenice Anne Neumann

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, vol. 120, issue C, 85-91

Abstract: Mean field games allow to describe tractable models of dynamic games with a continuum of players, explicit interaction and heterogeneous states. Thus, these models are of great interest for socio-economic applications. A particular class of these models are games with finite state and action space, for which recently in Neumann (2020a) a semi-explicit representation of all stationary equilibria has been obtained. In this paper we investigate whether these stationary equilibria are stable against model perturbations. We prove that the set of all games with only essential equilibria is residual and obtain two characterization results for essential stationary equilibria.

Keywords: Mean field game; Essential equilibrium; Stationary equilibrium; Finite state space; Finite action space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:120:y:2022:i:c:p:85-91

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.006

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