Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value

François Maublanc and Sébastien Rouillon

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 121, issue C, 20-25

Abstract: We study multiple-prize contests where the number of prizes to be awarded is a random variable. We identify conditions under which a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium exists. We compare the equilibrium efforts according to different probability distributions of the number of prizes. Considering multi-prize contests proposed so far in the literature, we show that each player’s effort decreases with the average number of prizes (first-order stochastic dominance) and may increase or decrease with the risk in the number of prizes (second-order stochastic dominance) depending on the contest technology adopted.

Keywords: Contest model; Rent-seeking; Multiple-prizes; Number uncertainty; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489622000816
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:121:y:2023:i:c:p:20-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.11.001

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().