Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

Robert C. Powers and Flannery Wells

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 122, issue C, 42-49

Abstract: Campbell and Kelly (2015) proved that, for m≥4 alternatives and n≥3 individuals, majority rule is the only social choice function defined on the Condorcet domain that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity, and neutrality. They left open the question whether these three properties characterize majority rule when n is a multiple of four and m is equal to three. We prove their characterization does hold in this case and in the process we give another characterization of majority rule.

Keywords: Condorcet domain; Majority rule; Neutrality; Strategy-proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:122:y:2023:i:c:p:42-49

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.001

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