Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction

Pablo Amoros

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 125, issue C, 1-10

Abstract: A group of students who have applied for scholarships must be ranked. The committee responsible for determining this ranking consists of the students’ advisors. While impartial towards other students, the advisors are biased towards favoring their students. This paper examines the implementation of the deserving ranking via backward induction. Some of the best-known sequential mechanisms utilized in the real world are ineffective. We present two simple and natural sequential mechanisms that prove to be effective. The first mechanism is suitable for when there are precisely three students, and the second is for four or more students.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Backward induction; Evaluation; Ranking of agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:125:y:2023:i:c:p:1-10

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001

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