Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 126, issue C, 107-118

Abstract: We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects.

Keywords: Pairwise exchange; Individual rationality; Constrained efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Maximal domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:126:y:2023:i:c:p:107-118

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004

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