Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos and Lars Ehlers

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, issue C, 10-15

Abstract: In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.

Keywords: Externalities; Partition function; Prenucleolus; Nucleolus; Optimistic; Reduced game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:128:y:2024:i:c:p:10-15

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003

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