The core in an N-firm dynamic Cournot oligopoly

Lei Wang and Jingang Zhao

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 129, issue C, 20-26

Abstract: This paper extends Scarf’s (1971) α-core result to a dynamic Cournot oligopoly. It shows that the α, β, γ-cores are all non-empty in an n-firm dynamic Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and symmetric quadratic costs.

Keywords: Dynamic Cournot oligopoly; Differential game; Open-loop information; Transferable utility core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:20-26

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.02.005

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