The ascending auction with flexible reporting

Xieji Zhang

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 132, issue C, 28-39

Abstract: In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.

Keywords: Assignment problem; Unit-demand; Ascending auctions; Flexible reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D59 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:28-39

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003

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