Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism

Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 132, issue C, 49-56

Abstract: There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight.

Keywords: Matching; School choice; College admission problems; Top trading cycles; Pareto efficiency; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:49-56

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001

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