Very weakly dominant strategies

Benjamin Bachi and Shiran Rachmilevitch

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 132, issue C, 75-78

Abstract: We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.

Keywords: Dominant strategies; Solution concepts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:75-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005

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