 Condorcet efficiency: Weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and BordaD. Marc Kilgour, Jean-Charles Grégoire and Angèle M. Foley Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025, vol. 135, issue C Abstract: We ask how good Bucklin-related procedures can be at identifying Condorcet winners in ranked-ballot, single-winner elections. Bucklin procedures can have a wide range of weighting vectors and thresholds; one, for example, applies Borda weights, analogous to the Borda Count in weighted scoring elections. Using simulation, we estimate the maximum Condorcet efficiency of both weighted Bucklin and weighted scoring elections as the number of voters becomes very large; these measures depend of course on the underlying distribution of ballots. For the impartial anonymous culture distribution, weighted Bucklin exhibits higher Condorcet efficiency than weighted scoring when there are 3 candidates, but is not as good when there are 4 candidates, and about equal when there are 5 or 6. We also compare them under the impartial culture distribution (equally good), and under a one-dimensional spatial model (weighted Bucklin is usually better, sometimes much better). Keywords: Multi-candidate elections; Ranked voting; Single-winner elections; Weighting vectors; Scoring rule; Bucklin voting; Condorcet efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:135:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000356 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102420 Access Statistics for this article Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier |
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