Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games

David Lowing and Kevin Techer

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025, vol. 137, issue C

Abstract: A limitation of transferable utility games is their inability to account for the varying participation levels that players may exhibit in cooperative activities. Multi-choice games address this issue by allowing players to participate at distinct levels. In this extended framework, several extensions of the Shapley value have been introduced. However, the relationships between these extensions remain unclear, and there is currently no solution concept that effectively reconciles them. In this paper, we aim to clarify the connections between two specific extensions of the Shapley value. We show that these extensions share comparable axiomatic characterizations. Furthermore, we propose a family of solutions that provides a consensus between the two extensions. To establish two distinct characterizations for this family, we introduce new axioms.

Keywords: Multi-choice games; Consensus Shapley values; Axiomatic method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489625000228
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games (2025)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:137:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000228

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102407

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().