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Cost-symmetric transfer rules for queueing with arrivals

Changyong Han and Youngsub Chun

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025, vol. 137, issue C

Abstract: For the queueing problem with arrivals, we investigate the implications of equal treatment of equal costs, which requires that two agents with the same unit waiting cost should end up with the same utility. We introduce the cost-symmetric min-transfer rule and show that it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and independence of larger costs together with equal treatment of equal costs. This rule coincides with the minimal transfer rule (Maniquet, 2003) in the static queueing problem. On the other hand, by replacing independence of larger costs with independence of smaller costs, we characterize the cost-symmetric max-transfer rule, which coincides with the maximal transfer rule (Chun, 2006b) in the static queueing problem.

Keywords: Arrival queueing problem; Cost-symmetric min-transfer rule; Cost-symmetric max-transfer rule; Equal treatment of equal costs; Axiomatic characterizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:137:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000319

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102416

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